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ABSTRACT—Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) v. Harvard—a case

alleging racial discrimination against Asian applicants in
undergraduate admissions on appeal to the First Circuit—is one of the
most notable recent equal protection challenges to be advanced almost
exclusively on the basis of statistical evidence. The case could well
end affirmative action in higher education and beyond if it winds up
at the Supreme Court. However, the central issue in this case is not an
evidentiary question about what is probative of discrimination; it is a
substantive question about what constitutes discrimination. The
plaintiffs SFFA put forward a substantive definition of racial
nondiscrimination—group-based conditional parity—under which
equal protection is denied if applicants grouped by race do not face
similar likelihood of admission conditional on having similar
credentials. Neither Harvard, in defending their affirmative action
practices, nor the trial judge, in ostensibly favoring Harvard’s expert
findings, meaningfully countered SFFA’s definition of discrimination.
This Essay argues that there is no good normative reason to accept this
definition of what equal protection demands in the context of higher
education admissions because it will be violated whenever groups sit
in some relation of social and material inequality to each other.
Furthermore, it is at odds with the Supreme Court’s line of cases
allowing universities to value racial diversity and the graded scrutiny
scale in the equal protection doctrine. Before to debating the content
of a substantive principle of nondiscrimination/equal protection with
respect to a particular form of groupness, we must first define what
constitutes that form of social groupness. A relation of equality and
fairness proposed by a principle of ‘nondiscrimination’ or ‘equal
protection’ is only valid in light of what makes the social grouping
what it is under current conditions.
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INTRODUCTION
There has been long standing debate—to put it mildly—raging over
which forms of equality the Equal Protection Clause protects.1 Students for
Fair Admissions, Inc. (SFFA) v. Harvard, a challenge to the undergraduate
admissions practices at (you guessed it) Harvard pending for almost five
years now,2 offers yet another opportunity to debate this question with
respect to racial equality. The case was spearheaded by a long-time critic of
affirmative action, Edward Blum, representing a group whose mission
statement is that, “[a] student’s race and ethnicity should not be factors that
either harm or help that student to gain admission to a competitive

1

See infra text accompanying notes 13–15. The entire “equality of what” debate in egalitarianism is
about this same issue. See, e.g., G.A. Cohen, Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods and Capabilities,
56 LOUVAIN ECON. REV. 357, 357 (1990); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of
Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185, 185 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of
Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 283 (1981); AMARTYA SEN, Equality of What?, in EQUAL
FREEDOM: SELECTED TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 307, 307 (Stephen Darwall ed., 1995). And
for a brilliant critique of the terms in which this debate are framed, see Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is
the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 287 (1999).
2
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. (SFFA) v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. (Harvard Corp.),
397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 132–33 (D. Mass. 2019).
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university.”3 Last September, a Massachusetts federal district court issued an
opinion upholding Harvard’s admission practices against that equal
protection challenge.4 As the appeal winds its way up—possibly to the
Supreme Court—the case could well decide the fate of affirmative action
well beyond elite universities. But the case is important for another reason:
it exposes a missing conceptual piece in this long-running debate about how
to interpret the demands of equal protection. It also perfectly illustrates why
missing that piece creates an incoherent legal doctrine, especially in the area
of affirmative action.
Most approaches in law and social science define racial discrimination
as the dissimilar treatment of persons in different racial groups who are
similarly situated, at least with respect to variables rationally relevant to the
domain in question. The plaintiff SFFA’s expert reports and legal arguments
track that definition. SFFA proposes that statistical evidence demonstrating
that applicants grouped by racial affiliations with similar observable
qualifications face different probabilities of admission means that Harvard’s
admissions process is discriminatory.5 That is, plaintiffs contend that groupbased conditional parity—similar likelihood of admission for applicants
grouped by race, conditional on having similar credentials—is the
substantive form of racial equality demanded by equal protection in college
admissions. Harvard’s statistical expert largely accepted that definition of
discrimination, as did the U.S. District Judge, Allison D. Burroughs, who
decided the case.6
This Essay argues that the plaintiffs’ proffered principle of which form
of equality the Equal Protection Clause protects in the context of college
admissions is deeply flawed. It is flawed both as a normative and as a legal
matter. The problem with SFFA’s definition of discrimination is that it fails
to explain why group-based conditional parity is the proper relation of
equality for this specific form of groupness by reference to what constitutes
‘race’ as a social grouping.7 An allegation that a practice treats people
unequally by virtue of racial groupness can only be settled by appealing to a
principle that evaluates the practice in light of what racial groupings are. It
cannot be settled by reference to a principle formulated by abstracting (or
assuming) away the social facts that make up the form of groupness we know

3
STUDENTS
FOR
FAIR
ADMISSIONS,
https://studentsforfairadmissions.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/54Z2-MRBB].
4
SFFA, 397 F. Supp. 3d at 205–06.
5
Id. at 163.
6
See, e.g., id. at 163–64, 172–73.
7
I will use single quotation marks to denote concepts and double quotation marks to denote verbatim
quotes throughout.
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of as ‘race.’ Principles of the latter variety are just nonresponsive to claims
of racial inequality. Furthermore, only principles of the former variety are
consistent with the Supreme Court’s entire graded scrutiny scale in equal
protection doctrine and its line of cases allowing universities to value racial
diversity.
Although it is hardly debatable that this case was brought with the
express purpose of dismantling affirmative action in higher education and
beyond,8 a number of commentators have argued that the case nonetheless
raises real and serious issues about admissions practices that stereotype
Asian applicants and discriminate against them by limiting their enrollment
at Harvard.9 Plaintiffs SFFA proffered substantial evidence that the relation
of conditional parity was violated with respect to Asian vis-à-vis white
applicants.10 But they proffered even more dramatic evidence that it is
violated between Asian vis-à-vis Black and Hispanic applicants (which the
plaintiffs’ expert repeatedly highlights in his reports), and between white visà-vis Black and Hispanic applicants.11 Many held out hope for a ruling that
would remedy the alleged artificial suppression of Asian enrollment vis-àvis white applicants without threatening the legal status of affirmative action
for African-American and Hispanic applicants.
Both Harvard, in defending their affirmative action practices, and the
judge, in ostensibly favoring Harvard’s expert findings, declined to counter
the content of SFFA’s definition of discrimination. In so doing, they failed
to offer a principled and sensical defense of the policy in the face of the
(almost exclusively) statistical evidence proffered by the plaintiffs.12 The
central issue in this case was not an evidentiary question about what was
probative of discrimination, but rather a substantive question about what
8
See, e.g., Alex Beam, The True Mission of the Lawsuit Against Harvard, BOS. GLOBE (June 25,
2018, 9:49 AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/06/25/the-true-mission-lawsuit-againstharvard/5ESyvmBDmCxDvkbIdsxcrO/story.html [https://perma.cc/636T-AXQ5]; Alvin Chang, Asians
Are Being Used to Make the Case Against Affirmative Action. Again., VOX (Aug. 30, 2018, 1:19 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2018/3/28/17031460/affirmative-action-asian-discrimination-admissions
[https://perma.cc/2KEL-A5HS].
9
Andrew Gelman, Sharad Goel & Daniel E. Ho, What Statistics Can’t Tell Us in the Fight over
Affirmative Action at Harvard, BOS. REV. (Jan. 14, 2019), http://bostonreview.net/law-justice/andrewgelman-sharad-goel-daniel-e-ho-what-statistics-cant-tell-us-fight-over [https://perma.cc/A2DM-GXBE];
Jeannie Suk Gersen, Anti-Asian Bias, Not Affirmative Action, Is on Trial in the Harvard Case, NEW
YORKER (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/anti-asian-bias-notaffirmative-action-is-on-trial-in-the-harvard-case [https://perma.cc/6JN6-AYLC].
10
See infra Section II.
11
See infra Section II.
12
”This statistical evidence is perhaps the most important evidence in reaching a resolution of this
case, given SFFA’s heavy reliance on the data to make out its claims.” Students for Fair Admissions, Inc.
(SFFA) v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. (Harvard Corp.), 397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 158 (D. Mass.
2019).
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constitutes discrimination. Without addressing that question, it was
impossible to even contemplate a remedy that could have addressed practices
between white and Asian applicants while preserving affirmative action for
Black and Hispanic applicants. I fear the kind of reasoning that won the day
in this case will, more often than not, be used to limit the reach of future
antidiscrimination and equal protection plaintiffs in domains well beyond
elite education.
I.

WHAT FORM OF EQUALITY DOES EQUAL PROTECTION PROTECT?

The Fourteenth Amendment commands that no state shall “deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”13 Like any
other statement of formal equality, the Amendment is incapable of being
applied without an independent principle of equality that gives normative
content to the demand for equal protection.14 Said simply, which form of
equality does the Equal Protection Clause protect? The plaintiffs’ statistical
evidence proposes what I will refer to as conditional statistical parity
(borrowing the term from computer scientists) as the proper way to define
what equal protection demands.15
The following formalizes what conditional statistical parity means in
the context of Harvard admission: The university must identify all things that
it says it values in applicants. Let’s call these valued credentials the Xs.16 The
13

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978) (“The concept of ‘discrimination,’
like the phrase ‘equal protection of the laws,’ is susceptible of varying interpretations . . . .”). The
scholarly literature is too extensive to be summarized, but see, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel,
The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination, 2 ISSUES LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP, 2003, at 1; Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal
Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1063–64 (2011); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976); Pamela S. Karlan, What Can Brown Do for
You?: Neutral Principles and the Struggle over the Equal Protection Clause, 58 DUKE L.J. 1049, 1051–
52 (2009); Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision
in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L. J. 1278, 1351–52 (2011).
15
Sam Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, The Measure and Mismeasure of Fairness: A Critical Review
of Fair Machine Learning, 2 ARXIV:1808.00023 [CS.CY], Aug. 14, 2018, at 2,
http://arxiv.org/abs/1808.00023 [https://perma.cc/W6BJ-82BF]; Cynthia Dwork et al., Fairness Through
Awareness, ARXIV:1104.3913 [CS.CC], Nov. 30, 2011, at 1, http://arxiv.org/abs/1104.3913
[https://perma.cc/28V4-F4HX]; Moritz Hardt et al., Equality of Opportunity in Supervised Learning,
2 ARXIV:1610.02413 [CS.LG],
Oct.
11,
2016,
at
1,
http://arxiv.org/abs/1610.02413
[https://perma.cc/AX7H-GWW3].
16
A logical requirement of this concept of discrimination is that the set of Xs cannot include groupspecific things (credentials that, by definition, only one group could possess, such as having a “white
upbringing” or “overcoming anti-Black racism”), otherwise it would be a backdoor way to violate the
principle of fairness they endorse. See, for example, a quote from Edward Blum, President of SFFA,
explaining that, “[w]e believe that a student’s skin color or ethnic heritage should not be used to help or
harm that student’s prospects of being admitted to a college or university.” Jay Caspian Kang, Where
14
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plaintiffs propose that ‘discrimination’ is defined by a lack of group-based
statistical parity,17 i.e., equal probability of admission conditional on having
the same valued credentials between racial groups:
P(A=1|X=x, G=b) ≠ P(A=1|X=x, G=w)
Conditional statistical parity is violated when applicants in racial
groups (on discrete values of G labeled, for example, as b or w) who share
the same values for all variables rationally related to goals of the institution
in question (the Xs) do not face the same probability of acceptance, P(A=1).
Given some of the Supreme Court’s elaborations of the Equal
Protection Clause over the years, it is hardly surprising that litigants would
proffer conditional statistical parity to define discrimination. For example,
“[t]he Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a direction that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike.”18 Some Justices in other
affirmative action cases have discussed statistical facts about admissions in
a way that suggests they endorse this operationalization of equal protection.19
Additionally, the Court’s evidentiary demands for equal protection claims in
other contexts, such as law enforcement, follows the same logic, requiring
defendants alleging selective enforcement to come forward with evidence
that people “similarly situated” with respect to rationally relevant
enforcement criteria and who differ only by race were treated differently.20
The plaintiffs’ expert report is organized around the definition of
discrimination as conditional statistical parity between racial groups. There
is a dizzying amount of data, and ways of analyzing it, in the 700-plus pages
of expert reports. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs’ approach to adducing statistical
evidence of discrimination comes down to a pretty straightforward
Does Affirmative Action Leave Asian-Americans?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 28, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/28/magazine/affirmative-action-asian-american-harvard.html
[https://perma.cc/B8TP-N3K8].
17
See Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 6–17, Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019) (No. 14cv-14176-ADB).
18
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
19
The discussion of dissimilar admission rates by race within given LSAT and GPA ranges by the
dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger perfectly illustrates why litigants might take conditional statistical parity
to capture the meaning of discrimination in higher education admissions. 539 U.S. 306, 382–85 (2003)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing evidence of “admission of less qualified underrepresented minorities
in preference to [Petitioner Grutter]” as evidence that “its alleged goal of ‘critical mass’ is simply a sham,”
and calling the “tight correlation between the percentage of applicants and admittees of a given race,”
evidence that the law school is admitting students “based on the aspirational assumption that all applicants
are equally qualified academically, and therefore that the proportion of each group admitted should be
the same as the proportion of that group in the applicant pool.”).
20
See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Eddie Murphy and the Dangers of Counterfactual Causal Thinking
About Detecting Racial Discrimination, 113 NW. U.L. REV. 1163, 1184–92 (2019) (citing cases where
similarly situated test was applied).
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exercise.21 First, plaintiffs seek to show that Asian applicants to Harvard are,
as a group, more qualified than other applicants grouped by race at least on
most observable characteristics.22 They mainly focus on academic
credentials, since Harvard is, after all, an elite academic institution, but they
also look at things like extracurricular activities, athletics, and high school
recommendations.23 Then, they seek to show that the probability of
admission differs between racial groups conditional on having the same
levels of other observable valued credentials.24 They also seek to show that
Asian applicants have a lower probability of receiving a more favorable
“personal”25 or “overall”26 rating from Harvard admissions staff which, in
turn, affects the probability of admission.27
Table 1 presents a stylized example of the plaintiffs’ logic of proof. The
table reflects the average distribution between the four largest applicant

21
See Expert Report of Peter S. Arcidiacono at 17–21, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President
& Fellows of Harvard Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019) (No. 14-cv-14176-ADB) [hereinafter
Plaintiff Expert Report] (describing why the expert believes the methods used, especially multinomial
logistic regressions, are the correct way to detect discrimination). For example, “[b]y controlling for test
scores, one can show that group A was being held to a higher standard than group B, all else equal.” Id.
at 18.
22
See id. at 26 (Figure 1.2), which shows the average SAT scores of applicants and admits by racial
groupings. The plaintiffs are clear that their evidence of discrimination is made by comparing all pairings
of “race” groups. See Rebuttal Expert Report of Peter S. Arcidiacono at 20, Students for Fair Admissions,
Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019) (No. 14-cv-14176ADB) [hereinafter Plaintiff Rebuttal Report] (“Understanding Harvard’s use of race in evaluating
domestic applicants involves distinctions drawn across all four major racial groups in the applicant pool:
Asian Americans, whites, African Americans, and Hispanics.”) (emphasis in original).
23
E.g., Plaintiff Expert Report, supra note 21, at 4, 14, 15, 26, 33, 37.
24
The simplest way of understanding the logic of this evidence is simply descriptive, such as the
figure on Plaintiff Expert Report, supra note 21, at 31 tbl.2.1, but the same logic applies to more complex
logistic models.
25
While there is no single definition of the “personal” rating, it is a general assessment of “[p]ersonal
quality” and includes such factors such as whether an individual will “contribute to the class, classroom,
[or] roommate group,” as well as “integrity, helpfulness, courage, [and] kindness.” Plaintiff Rebuttal
Report, supra note 22, at 14 n.8; see also Report of David Card, Ph.D. at 20, Students for Fair Admissions,
Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019) (No. 14-cv-14176ADB) [hereinafter Harvard Expert Report] (noting that among the “personal qualities” Harvard looks for
are “economic resources and family hardship, personal essays and interviews, artistic qualities, maturity
and ability to balance multiple commitments, and the degree of parental involvement . . .”).
26
The “overall” rating “is a score that purports to reflect Harvard’s overall assessment of the
applicant; it is not an average of [the other ratings], but it takes them into account.” Plaintiff Expert
Report, supra note 21, at 4; see also Harvard Expert Report, supra note 25, at 26 (“Deposition testimony
indicates that the overall rating (a) takes into account the profile ratings but is not a formulaic summation
or average of those ratings, and (b) can reflect other aspects of an application that the reviewer considered
but that are not captured in the profile ratings (including race).”).
27
See, e.g., Plaintiff Expert Report, supra note 21, at 35–40, 59 (“Receiving a 2 or better on
Harvard’s overall rating is especially important for an applicant’s chances of admission.”).
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racial-ethnic groups by academic decile.28 If Harvard exclusively valued
academic credentials, saved money by dismissing its admissions staff, and
just admitted the top decile, it would admit the racial-ethnic diversity shown
in the second to last row, as opposed to the average racial-ethnic makeup of
its admitted class shown in the last row. The plaintiffs adduce tables like this,
and more sophisticated statistical exercises like multinomial logistic
regression, to substantiate the claim that conditional statistical parity
between racial groups was violated.29
TABLE 1: AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION OF APPLICANTS BY RACE AND DECILE 30
Applicant Pool of 20,000
White

AfricanAmerican

Hispanic

AsianAmerican

Total

Top Decile

726

15

54

1,023

1,818

Bottom 9

8,012

2,366

2,710

5,095

18,182

Total

8,738

2,381

2,764

6,118

20,000

Admit Class of 2,000
% of each
group if admit
just top
academic
decile
Actual share of
admitted class
(5.3)

36.30%

0.75%

2.70%

51.15%

37.16%

15.81%

14.90%

24.86%

28
The distributions were made by averaging the 2014–2019 admissions data from Table B.5.7, and
then applying those distributions to an applicant pool of 20,000, where roughly 2,000 students are
admitted. Id. at app. B tbl.B.5.7. These numbers roughly correlate with the total size of the applicant pool
and admitted class at Harvard. A similar table for the entire “baseline” dataset can be found in Table 5.1.
Id. at 41 tbl.5.1; see also id. at 2 (explaining the plaintiffs’ expert separated applicants into two groups:
(1) the “baseline,” which was all domestic, regular decision applicants except (a) recruited athletes, (b)
legacies, (c) Dean’s or Director’s Interest List individuals, and (d) the children of Harvard faculty or staff,
because these groups experience significantly higher admit rates; and (2) the “expanded” set, which was
simply all domestic applicants). This is the clearest example of the plaintiffs’ proposed fairness selection
rule: “[R]andomly drawing from the top academic index decile (in the baseline dataset) would cause
Asian-American admits to more than double . . . .” Plaintiff Rebuttal Report, supra note 22, at 13.
29
See, e.g., Plaintiff Expert Report, supra note 21, at 61–68, app. A.
30
Despite the use of the terms “African American” and “Asian American” in the case, it should be
noted that the categories cover a substantial portion of applicants that are either “African” or “Caribbean”
or from other countries but are considered in the U.S. in the “Black” racial category and all East and Near
Asian ancestry under “Asian American.”
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Plaintiffs repeat this logic with the personal ratings.31 Table 2, taken
directly from the plaintiffs’ expert report, shows the proportion of applicants
in each academic decile who are given the personal rankings in the top tier
(a two or higher), broken down by different racial groups.
TABLE 2: SHARE RECEIVING A TWO OR HIGHER ON THE PERSONAL RATING BY
RACE/ETHNICITY AND ACADEMIC INDEX DECILE, BASELINE SAMPLE 32
Academic
Index
Decile

Whites

African
American

Hispanic

Asian
American

Total

1

8.11%

9.49%

8.48%

8.01%

8.81%

2

12.58%

15.75%

13.16%

12.91%

13.57%

3

16.25%

23.35%

17.77%

13.46%

17.16%

4

18.62%

28.95%

20.39%

14.24%

18.91%

5

20.40%

33.89%

25.60%

15.69%

20.56%

6

22.72%

35.04%

28.41%

16.46%

21.69%

7

22.59%

40.00%

30.03%

18.11%

22.01%

8

26.10%

39.57%

32.20%

17.93%

23.20%

9

28.23%

40.31%

30.24%

20.87%

24.74%

10

29.62%

46.97%

34.21%

22.20%

25.46%

Average

21.29%

19.01%

18.69%

17.65%

19.52%

Although the plaintiffs seek to show that conditional statistical parity is
violated when comparing Asian and white applicants, their most dramatic
claims of violation are made when comparing Asian and Black applicants:
Race plays a significant role in admissions decisions. Consider the example of
an Asian-American applicant who is male, is not disadvantaged, and has other
characteristics that result in a 25% chance of admission. Simply changing the
race of this applicant to white—and leaving all his other characteristics the
same—would increase his chance of admission to 36%. Changing his race to
Hispanic (and leaving all other characteristics the same) would increase his
chance of admission to 77%. Changing his race to African-American (again,

31
See, e.g., Plaintiff Rebuttal Report, supra note 22, at 22 (“[S]imilarly situated African-American
applicants receive much higher personal ratings than their Asian-American counterparts. AfricanAmerican applicants in the third-worst decile receive higher personal ratings than Asian-American
applicants in the top decile.”) (emphasis in original).
32
Id. at app. C tbl.5.6R.
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leaving all other characteristics the same) would increase his chance of
admission to 95%.33

While I have no idea what metaphysical or empirical meaning the
proposition “simply changing the race of this applicant” could have,34 the
above quote does have a clear statistical meaning, which is simply that,
conditional on having some set of observable credentials, white, Hispanic,
and Black applicants have some [X, Y, and Z respectively] higher probability
of admission compared to Asian applicants.35
Harvard and their expert, for the most part, implicitly accept the
plaintiffs’ definition of discrimination by dedicating most of their report to
trying to make evidence of unequal conditional statistical parity go away—
at least with respect to comparing Asian to white applicants—basically by
adding more conditions (Xs) into their model.36 First, they argue that “it is
difficult to quantify and include in a statistical model many of the nonacademic and contextual factors that Harvard’s admissions process values.”37
Second, they argue that if we could observe and quantify all of the qualitative
factors about applicants, then evidence of unequal conditional statistical
parity would go away.38 As explained below, my problem is not with the
33

Plaintiff Expert Report, supra note 21, at 3 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Id.; see also Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 20, at 1205–06. Another befuddling example: “Absent
racial preferences, African-American applicants would be treated as white applicants.” Plaintiff Rebuttal
Report, supra note 22, at 47.
35
See, e.g., Plaintiff Rebuttal Report, supra note 22, at 46 (“Professor Card’s own models show that
racial preferences are responsible for tripling the number of African-American admits and doubling the
number of Hispanic admits.”) (emphasis in original). Here, and in many other places, the plaintiffs’ expert
describes statistical relation that obtains between numbers in a data set as either subjective mental states
(i.e., “preferences”) or causal relations (i.e., “penalties” or “tips”).
36
See generally Harvard Expert Report, supra note 25, at 25–45. For a clear statement of this
principle, see id. at 39–40. Many of the “contextual factors” that Harvard’s expert adds to his model to
make evidence of unequal conditional statistical parity go away are things that are partially constitutive
of racial categories, things such as “the quality of the applicant’s high school, the socioeconomic
characteristics of the applicant’s high school and neighborhood, and the applicant’s family background.”
Id. at 33; see also Rebuttal Report of David Card, Ph.D. at 15–17, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v.
President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019) No. 14-cv-14176-ADB
[hereinafter Harvard Rebuttal Report]. As the plaintiffs point out, defendants do not claim that there is
conditional statistical parity when comparing Asian and Black or Hispanic applicants. Instead, the
defendants argue that race only has an “effect” for those who already have a high probability of admission,
Harvard Expert Report, supra note 25, at 81, 84, and that “[r]ace is less important than unmeasured,
individualized factors.” Id. at 85.
37
Harvard Expert Report, supra note 25, at 32.
38
Id. (“[T]here may well also be racial differences in the many other non-academic factors (like the
personal essay) that are not observable in the database and that are important to the admissions process
given the large pool of applicants with extraordinary academic achievements.”). Harvard’s approach to
making the racial differentials go away is similar for personal ratings, largely arguing that, first, alumni
ratings are not based on the full record that Harvard admission staff personal and overall ratings are based
on, and second, the plaintiffs’ models are “quite low in predictive accuracy and do not reliably control
34
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methods used to substantiate whether conditional statistical parity is violated
with respect to particular racial groups, it is with using that as the definition
of what constitutes denial of equal protection.
II. SO WHAT’S WRONG WITH CONDITIONAL STATISTICAL PARITY?
The remainder of this Essay explores what is wrong with adopting
conditional statistical parity as the substantive principle giving content to
equal protection on the basis of race in admissions. First, as mentioned in the
Introduction, adopting conditional parity foreclosed a ruling that could find
that the plaintiffs’ evidence makes out discrimination between applicants
grouped by ‘white’ and ‘Asian’ but not, for example, between those grouped
by ‘white’ and ‘Black’ because the principle demands the same relation of
equality no matter what relations of inequality constitute the groups in
question. Said another way, adopting the universal principle of conditional
statistical parity means that no empirical reason explaining why the
applicants’ credentials (the Xs) are patterned differently between people
grouped by race could ever be a normative reason to reject the principle.
Second, adopting conditional statistical parity is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s line of cases allowing universities to value racial diversity,
and it is inconsistent with the entire logic of the graded scrutiny scale in the
equal protection doctrine. The only reasons we have for heightened moral
concern with establishing some to-be-specified relation of equality between
these groups (i.e., people grouped by the concept of ‘race’) is that people so
grouped have in the past, and currently do, sit in some relation of inequality
to one other.
My negative argument about what is wrong with conditional statistical
parity will also advance my positive argument. A relation of equality
enshrined in the principle of ‘nondiscrimination’ or ‘equal protection’
between people categorized by some grouping is only valid in light of what
makes the social grouping what it is under current social conditions.
Therefore, prior to debating the content of a substantive principle of
nondiscrimination or equal protection with respect to a particular grouping,
we must first define what constitutes that social group. Only then can we
ask: Given what this grouping is, what are fair and just ways of making
decisions in this domain, what goals and interests ought to be recognized as
legitimate, and are the currently employed means narrowly tailored in the
right way?

for the many hard-to-measure factors that are likely very important to the determination of the ratings.”
Id. at 74.

11

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

Conditional statistical parity will be violated between any two groups
where one has a lower average credential raking than the other, and Harvard
seeks to increase admissions of the lower-mean group beyond what would
be produced by simply admitting on the basis of those credentials alone.
First, the plaintiffs’ proposed content for the Equal Protection Clause
gives us no way to normatively differentiate between the following statistical
facts (taken from Table 2).39 Within the top academic decile of applicants:
(1) the percent of Black applicants that Harvard staff awards the top two
personal ratings is 2.1 times higher than the percent of Asian applicants (47%
vs. 22%);
(2) the percent of Black applicants that Harvard staff awards the top two
personal ratings is 1.6 times higher than the percent of white applicants (47%
vs. 30%); and
(3) the percent of white applicants that Harvard staff awards the top two
personal ratings is 1.3 times higher than the percent of Asian applicants (30%
vs. 22%).
There is no logical way for a court to find (3) to be evidence of
discrimination against Asian applicants in favor of white applicants, while at
the same time declining to find (1) and (2) evidence of discrimination against
Asian or white applicants in favor of Black or Hispanic applicants, and
thereby preserve affirmative action for the latter groups, if equal protection
of the law is violated whenever the relation of conditional statistical parity is
violated between people grouped by race.
Second, if equal protection in higher education admissions is defined
by the relation of conditional parity, then all sorts of groups are being denied
equal protection by Harvard, such as groupings based on a “disadvantaged”
versus “not disadvantaged” background, or coming from an under-served,
nonelite, or low-income geographic region versus coming from a wellresourced, elite, rich geographic region. Why? Because those groupings are
characterized by the same statistical differentials as racial groupings: they
apply to Harvard at different rates with different average academic and other
valued credentials.
A. An Analogy to Socioeconomic Class
Consider the groupings based on a “disadvantaged” versus “not
disadvantaged” background, which according to the plaintiffs, is a
designation assigned by the admissions staff “if the reader believes the
applicant is from a very modest economic background.”40 The plaintiffs
39
40
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report that 12.87% of the applicants in their “baseline dataset” are classified
as disadvantaged by Harvard admissions staff.41 Here again, if Harvard
exclusively valued academic credentials, saved money by dismissing its
admissions staff, and just admitted the top decile, it would produce a pattern
of admissions with respect to the disadvantaged grouping. For illustrative
purposes, assume 129 of the 2000 entering freshmen, or roughly 6.4%,
would be “disadvantaged.” That pattern is simply a feature of the conditional
distribution of “disadvantaged” within the top decile, which is a fancy way
of saying that a higher proportion of candidates in the top academic decile
are “not disadvantaged.”
TABLE 3: ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGE ACROSS APPLICANT POOL OF 20,000
Not
Disadvantaged

Not
Disadvantaged

Total

Disadvantaged
(%)

Disadvantaged
(%)

Top decile*

1,871

129

2,000

93.75%

6.44%

Bottom 9

15,555

2,445

18,000

0

0

Total

17,426

2.574

20,000

Now, if Harvard came to believe that its educational mission cannot be
served when only 6.4% of the entering class come from disadvantaged
economic backgrounds and if they accordingly purposefully increased the
number of disadvantaged admits—which is what it means to be free to value
socioeconomic diversity—they will have to draw from the lower nine
academic deciles in order to admit those extra disadvantaged applicants.
How many? Who knows. That is a subject to debate. But certain
mathematical facts are going to be true if they increase the number of
disadvantaged applicants by even one. Namely, the relation of conditional
statistical parity will be violated between people grouped by
“disadvantaged” versus “not disadvantaged” status: P(A=1|X=high
academic, G=not disadvantaged) < P(A=1|X=high academic,
G=disadvantaged), and P(A=1|X=low academic, G=not disadvantaged) <
P(A=1|X=low academic, G=disadvantaged). Meaning, within the top
academic decile, applicants who are not disadvantaged will have a lower
probability of admissions than applicants who are disadvantaged (indeed, the

41
Id. at app. A tbl.A.7. The publicly available portions of the expert reports do not report crosstabulations of disadvantage and academic rankings, so the stylized example below was constructed
assuming that a higher percentage of applicants categorized as “not disadvantaged” were in the top
academic decile (roughly 10%), compared to the percentage of applicants categorized as “disadvantaged”
(roughly 5%).
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latter group will have a probability of admission equal to one); and within
the bottom nine academic deciles, applicants who are disadvantaged will
face a higher probability of admission than applicants who are not
disadvantaged (indeed, the latter group will have a probability of admission
equal to zero).
It is a feature of the overall applicant distribution that there are more
applicants in the “not disadvantaged” than “disadvantaged” group (by a
factor of almost seven to one), and there are significantly more of the former
within the top academic decile (by a factor of roughly fifteen to one).42 The
fact that conditional statistical parity will be violated between not
disadvantaged and disadvantaged applicants does not tell us which of the
candidates in the underrepresented group will be admitted, but the groupbased conditional probabilities will necessarily be uneven when the groupbased conditional distributions of the other valued factors are different.
Now, one might note that these tradeoffs are contingent on the marginal
distribution of disadvantage, i.e., the respective proportions of
“disadvantaged” versus “not disadvantaged” within each academic decile. If
one made the proportions of these two groups identical within the top
academic deciles, then one would not face that tradeoff. Yes, that is true.
And that is why one needs a theory of the relevant form of groupness before
one can propose a substantive principle of equality with respect to that form
of groupness.
By examining what the groupness of “disadvantaged” is, we see that—
insofar as Harvard is committed to increasing the proportion of its entering
class from that group—then some tradeoff between admitting applicants on
the basis of academic ratings and representativeness of “disadvantaged” is
unavoidable. To be in the category “disadvantaged” is to be ranked with
respect to attributes such as household financial resources, parents’ social
prestige, heads of households’ occupations, cultural opportunities, and
access to elite networks, relative to other people. Those classified in the
group “disadvantaged” by definition have less of such attributes than those
classified as “not disadvantaged.” Therefore, the fact that applicants
designated “not disadvantaged” have a higher proportion of persons that
score in the top academic decile compared to those designated
“disadvantaged” is not a random statistical correlation. Having access to high
quality schools, private tutors, adults (parents or paid childcare workers) who
have the time and resources to monitor and promote the child’s academic
success, and cultural capital interpreted as intellectual potential is
constitutive of what it is to be in the category “not disadvantaged.” There
42
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might be some things that are randomly correlated (i.e., without a social
mechanism to explain it) or not correlated at all with the category—
consumption of mayonnaise, thinking Ariana Grande’s new album is good
(it’s not), addresses that start with a prime number—but scoring well on
academic measurements is not one of them.43 This has nothing to do with the
inherent potential of persons grouped as “disadvantaged;” it is a reflection of
the social facts that constitute what socioeconomic stratification is.44
B. Back to Race
The same is true for race. By examining what the groupness of ‘race’
is, one sees that it is not merely a grouping made possible by innate biological
or genetic facts. Rather, it is a grouping made possible by social and
economic differentiation that has made certain biological and genetic facts
emerge as salient cultural designations. This take on what it is to have racial
categories is often referred to as the social constructivist view, which holds
that bodily markers of race currently have social meanings only by virtue of
the specific social, political, cultural, legal, economic, etc. arrangements in
this particular society. Here in the United States, the history of racial group
formation is a history of inequality, subjugation, exclusion, and in many
cases, horrific exploitation. The category ‘white,’ for example, has been
forged by enslaving, excluding, or legally limiting the life chances of persons
defined in contradistinction to ‘whiteness,’ through practices from chattel
slavery, naturalization law limiting citizenship to “free white person[s] . . .

43
If the correlation between the status “disadvantaged” and academic rankings were merely random
(like the one we may find between mayonnaise consumption and academic rankings), it would mean there
are no existing social mechanisms we could point to in order to justify accepting some tradeoff between
admitting strictly on the basis of academic ranking and “disadvantaged” representativeness. Let’s imagine
that admitting on the basis of academic credentials alone created a stark pattern of admissions with respect
to mayo consumption—say Harvard observed that 0% of its freshman class ever consumed any
mayonnaise. We do not care about that outcome (or should not care, by my lights) because being in the
group ‘no mayo consumed’ is simply to share some thin preference for a random food condiment. In
contrast, to be in the group “disadvantaged” is to share a lack of economic and social resources relative
to another group of people, resources that in our current world have huge implications for life chances.
So, we care (or should care, by my lights) when admitting on the basis of academic credentials alone
creates a stark pattern of admissions with respect to “disadvantaged,” but not with respect to mayo
consumption, because of what the former groupness is.
44
This logic is reflected in the College Board’s proposal, which it eventually abandoned, to include
an “adversity score” for college admissions officers including factors such as “the relative quality of the
student’s high school and the crime rate and poverty level of the student’s neighborhood.” Anemona
Hartocollis, SAT’s New ‘Adversity Score’ Will Take Students’ Hardships into Account, N.Y. TIMES (May
16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/16/us/sat-score.html [https://perma.cc/P77W-KL3L]; see
also Anemona Hartocollis, SAT ‘Adversity Score’ Is Abandoned in Wake of Criticism, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
27,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/27/us/sat-adversity-score-college-board.html
[https://perma.cc/NS7D-ENYJ].
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of good character,”45 and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882,46 to the violent
subjugation of Mexican, Central, and South American migrants.47 There is
nothing inherent to the groups that we know of as ‘races’ that created these
relations of inequality; these practices were historical contingencies.
The historical contingencies that in fact unfolded help explain the
contemporary relations of inequality that constitute current racial
groupings.48 Persistent relations of inequality are reflected in countless social
science studies of racial disparities—from prenatal care to end-of-life
palliative care—and include disparities in primary and secondary academic
measures.49 As shown in Table 1, there are fewer African-American and
45
An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790) (repealed 1795);
see also, United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 209–10 (1923) (holding that the racial
designation “white” in naturalization statute was in fact a “popular” not “scientific” meaning of the word,
which “for the practical purposes of the statute, must be applied to a group of living
persons now possessing in common the requisite characteristics, not to groups of persons who are
supposed to be or really are descended from some remote, common ancestor, but who, whether they both
resemble him to a greater or less extent, have, at any rate, ceased altogether to resemble one another,” in
an action by the government to cancel the citizenship of someone of “high caste Hindu stock, born in
Punjab, one of the extreme northwestern districts of India, and classified by certain scientific authorities
as of the Caucasian or Aryan race.”); Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 195–96 (1922)
(interpreting the first naturalization act of 1790 limiting citizenship to “free white persons” and holding
that although it was adopted at the time “it was employed by them for the sole purpose of excluding the
black or African race and the Indians then inhabiting this country,” it should be interpreted to mean that
“only free white persons shall be included,” and therefore, “the brown or yellow races of Asia” are
necessarily ineligible for citizenship).
46
Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943); see also Kitty Calavita, The
Paradoxes of Race, Class, Identity, and “Passing”: Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 1882–1910,
25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 10–14 (2000).
47
See, e.g., MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN
IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE (1998); IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (10th ed. 2006).
48
This is why Justice O’Connor’s optimistic sunsetting of the use of race-conscious admissions
policies in Grutter seemed so out of touch with the actual reality of persistent and entrenched racial
equality. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341–42 (2003). “[W]e are nowhere close to the kind of
sustained improvement in opportunities for people of color that would justify Justice O’Connor’s
optimism.” Elise C. Boddie, The Future of Affirmative Action, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 38, 43-44 (2016).
The Court’s own limits on policies explicitly dedicated to achieving racial equality are one of the main
impediments to achieving that world. See, e.g., Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Fisher’s Cautionary Tale
and the Urgent Need for Equal Access to an Excellent Education, 130 HARV. L. REV. 185, 188 (2016).
49
STEADY GAINS AND STALLED PROGRESS: INEQUALITY AND THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP
(Katherine Magnuson & Jane Waldfogel eds., 2008); William A. Grobman et al., Racial and Ethnic
Disparities in Maternal Morbidity and Obstetric Care, 125 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1460, 1466
(2015); Melissa A. LoPresti et al., End-of-Life Care for People with Cancer from Ethnic Minority Groups:
A Systematic Review, 33 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. 291, 301 (2016); Alexander K. Smith et
al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in End-of-Life Care in Fee-for-Service Medicare Beneficiaries with
Advanced Cancer, 57 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 153, 156–57 (2009); Linda Villarosa, Why America’s
Black Mothers and Babies Are in a Life-or-Death Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/magazine/black-mothers-babies-death-maternal-mortality.html
[https://perma.cc/3F5P-THC6].
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Hispanic applicants to Harvard relative to white and Asian applicants, and a
much smaller proportion of the former two groups are in the top academic
decile relative to the latter two. One explanation is that race and ethnicity
groupings are highly correlated with the “disadvantaged” status. According
to the plaintiffs’ expert report, about 6% of the white applicants are
categorized as “disadvantaged,” compared to 11% of the Asian applicants,
almost 30% of the African-American applicants, and 25% of the Hispanic
applicants.50 In the language of constructivism, to be in a designated racial
category in America is not merely to have some set of physical features or
genetic markers. It also includes standing in a particular probabilistic relation
to academic achievement by virtue of certain social, cultural, or economic
arrangements.51 The strong correlation between disadvantage and AfricanAmerican and Hispanic designations is not a random, surprising cooccurrence. For a constructivist, the racial patterns in academic ranking do
not reflect anything about biological or genetic facts, much less inherent
capacity for academic excellence. They reflect the very social facts that make
racial groupings what they are in the United States.
Therefore, if race is a category made possible by, among other things,
social and economic stratification, then there is no good normative reason to
adopt conditional statistical parity as the principle of what equal protection
demands for these groups in this domain.52
This brings me to the second reason to reject conditional statistical
parity to define denial of equal protection on the basis of race in admissions:
it is irreconcilable with the doctrine of strict scrutiny for racial classifications
and the Supreme Court’s tolerance of a university’s prerogative to pursue
“the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.”53

50

Plaintiff Expert Report, supra note 21, at app. B tbl.B.3.1.
As the entire field of “neighborhood effects” has shown, individual-level disadvantage
designations fail to capture the true social meaning of concentrated, intergenerational disadvantage,
especially for African-Americans. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO
AND THE ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 97–121 (2012); PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE:
URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 91–136 (2013).
52
Few constructivists would hold that racial categories exists only by virtue of economic inequality.
53
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). I say “tolerance” because recognition of this value
as a compelling state interest has been narrowly eked out over the years. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of
Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 310 (2013) [hereinafter Fisher I] (stating that “the decision to pursue ‘the
educational benefits that flow from student body diversity,’ that the University deems integral to its
mission is, in substantial measure, an academic judgment to which some, but not complete, judicial
deference is proper”) (internal citations omitted).
51
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C. Conditional Statistical Parity Cannot Be Reconciled with the Doctrine
of Strict Scrutiny and the Freedom to Value Racial Diversity
It is a mathematical fact that conditional statistical parity will be
violated between any two groups whenever one group has a lower average
ranking than the other on valued credentials (the Xs), and a university seeks
to increase admissions of that group. But race is a special form of groupness
under the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court has interpreted the
Equal Protection Clause to mean that, the “government may treat people
differently because of their race only for the most compelling reasons.”54 So,
it is one thing if conditional statistical parity is violated between the groups
‘rural Kentucky applicants’ and ‘Upper East Side Manhattan applicants,’ or
between the groups ‘disadvantaged applicants’ and ‘not disadvantaged
applicants,’ because the latter groupings are only subject to rational basis
review.55 But, it is another thing when conditional statistical parity is violated
between racial groups because the Supreme Court has held that, “all racial
classifications are categorically prohibited unless they are ‘necessary to
further a compelling governmental interest’ and ‘narrowly tailored to that
end.’”56
But SFFA cannot have it both ways by appealing to the special
significance of categorization on the basis of race to trigger a searching
consideration of its use, and then denying the special significance of the
category of race when it comes to giving content to which form of equality
equal protection protects. Equal protection doctrine assumes that the state
can use all sorts of groupings and classifications—such as on the basis of
ascribed cognitive or mental disability,57 or number of years operating a food
pushcart in the French Quarter of New Orleans.58 Although “the wholly
54

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
“A century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively
supports the application of the traditional standard of review, which requires only that the State’s system
be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.” San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
56
Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 316 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
57
See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 442 (1985) (holding that
because “[t]he general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest” the court of appeals
“erred in holding mental retardation a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard of
judicial review than is normally accorded economic and social legislation”).
58
See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 299, 305 (1976) (holding that the
“grandfather provision” of a New Orleans statute banning pushcarts that have not been in operation for
more than twenty years from the historic French Quarter was not a “totally arbitrary and irrational method
of achieving the city’s purpose,” which was “to preserve its distinctive charm, character, and economic
vitality,” notwithstanding the fact that the categorization differentially harmed pushcart operators on the
basis of a grouping that was not necessarily going to assure the preferred operators would respect the
traditions or preserve the distinctive historical character any more than the disfavored operators).
55
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arbitrary act[s]” can in theory be struck down under rational basis review,59
the deference enshrined in rational basis review doctrine presumes that
classifications as such are not problematic and, accordingly, most forms of
grouping are not properly policed by the federal judiciary for rationality or
random meanness. If racial groups only reflected groupings made purely on
the basis of innate features presumed to have some link to ancestral
geographic origin or common genetic structure, then there would be no
reason to subject this grouping to strict scrutiny as opposed to rational basis
review. And if what is wrong with the state using a particular form of
grouping is merely that a state actor (or private actor with state funding) is
demonstrating irrationality or even meanness by differentiating between
people so grouped, then why care more when the grouping is race than when
it is years of owning a pushcart?
The graded scrutiny scale in equal protection doctrine tracks social
categories where our moral reasons for being extra concerned about state
action have everything to do with the social facts that make those groupings
what they are—namely, groupings of past and current stratification,
oppression, and inequality. Only when the groupness has a certain quality do
we think there might be good reasons to overcome deference to legislative
judgements, separation of powers, liberal pluralism, federalism, or the
prerogatives of private institutions about how to articulate and pursue their
missions.60
But SFFA wants to have it both ways with equal protection doctrine.
They rely on the doctrine of strict scrutiny to get massive discovery from
Harvard about its admissions practices because it uses the racial status of
applicants to make admissions decisions, and to demand narrow tailoring of
the use of racial classifications. But then—when it comes to debating which
substantive principle should give content to equal protection between groups
classified in this domain (i.e., what purposes are legitimate and which means
are narrowly tailored in the right way)—they ignore the moral reasons why
the doctrine exists for the classification of race but not for years of pushcart
ownership. My argument is simply that one needs to take account of what
constitutes the relevant form of groupness in any proposal about what the
correct relation of equality ought to be between people grouped in that way.
Adopting my argument does not dictate the content of what equal
protection demands in college admissions. However, it does, as in the
59
Id. at 304 (“[T]he wholly arbitrary act . . . cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
60
“In short, the judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of
legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along
suspect lines . . . .” Id. at 303.
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example of socioeconomic class above, mean that we cannot have the debate
about what criteria are fair vis-à-vis different groups or what adequate
narrow tailoring ought to look like by assuming away the social facts that
constitute the groups about which a party is charging discrimination. Just as
one cannot debate what selection criteria would be fair vis-à-vis the groups
“disadvantaged” and “not disadvantaged” by assuming equal or average
resources between their members, one cannot debate what selection criteria
would be fair vis-à-vis groups designated as ‘races’ by assuming equal social
and economic resources because the latter, like the former, is a social
classification system partially constituted by some form of stratification.
There was a glimmer of recognition of this fact in Fisher II, where the
Court held that “a university may institute a race-conscious admissions
program as a means of obtaining ‘the educational benefits that flow from
student body diversity.’”61 If Harvard believes that it cannot reap “the
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body,”62 by relying just
on academic credentials to produce a freshman class that consists of .075%
Black and 2.7% Hispanic students,63 then the only candidates that can
“diversify” the freshman class along racial lines are the ones classified in the
underrepresented groups under a scheme valuing only academic credentials
(or whatever other valued credentials are unequal by racial groupings). As
shown in Table 1, any steps taken towards that end—even as small as
admitting one additional black or Hispanic student—will violate conditional
statistical parity.
Moreover, the only facts that the Court has recognized as justifying the
continued use of “race-conscious” admissions plans are the currently
stratified social conditions of people classified by race. Fisher II put
universities on notice that they “must continue to use [admissions] data to
scrutinize the fairness of its admissions program; to assess whether changing
demographics have undermined the need for a race-conscious policy . . . .”64
Meaning, if the presently existing inequalities that are responsible for the
differentials in academic credentials between racial groupings ceased to
exist, then, according to these Supreme Court justices, there would no longer
be a legitimate reason to tolerate “race conscious” admissions plans. The
social inequalities that are responsible for the unequal racial composition
within the applicant pool’s top academic decile, to which the plaintiffs’ point
to prove conditional statistical parity is being violated, are the very same
61

Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210 (2016) [hereinafter Fisher II] (internal
citations omitted).
62
Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297, 297 (2013).
63
See Plaintiff Expert Report, supra note 21, at tbl.5.3.
64
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214.
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social inequalities that justify the continued use of race to produce racial
diversity under the Supreme Court’s logic.65
CONCLUSION
This case is, to my knowledge, one of the most notable affirmative
action cases ever to proceed almost exclusively on the basis of statistical
evidence. The district court’s ruling preserved affirmative action for today.
But I fear its reasoning and treatment of statistical evidence threatens future
civil rights plaintiffs. The pages and pages of descriptive statistics and the
debates over the proper specification of logistic regressions—which
marginal effects to estimate, what variables to interact, or how to pool the
data—obscured a much deeper question that must, logically, premise the
entire evidentiary enterprise. That question is: What relation of equality are
we looking for in all of this evidence?
SFFA’s expert reports and filings go to great lengths to highlight the
violation of conditional statistical parity between Asian and Black
applicants.66 Yet, the court’s opinion almost exclusively focuses on
adjudicating statistical evidence about the conditional statistical parity
between Asian and white applicants, saying almost nothing about the
former.67 But without explaining why it is normatively (and legally)
justifiable to reject this principle as the instantiation of what equal protection
demands—in this domain and between these groups—the opinion fails to
address the central issue in the case.
The statistical evidence showing that Harvard is pursuing racial
diversity in the context of racial inequality is not inconsistent with their
admissions officers harboring and relying on stereotypes about Asian
applicants.68 Indeed, it would be surprising if this was not the case, given that
living in a racialized society means that we all harbor stereotypes about racial
groups.69 But the mathematical upshot of pursuing racial diversity given the
65
“Postsecondary institutions consider the race of applicants in substantial part because of the racial
achievement gap between applicants on standardized test scores and the systemic disparities within
elementary and secondary education that cause these gaps.” Robinson, supra note 48, at 187.
66
See Plaintiff Expert Report, supra note 21, at 67–68, 73–74 (proffering an ostensible model of the
change in Asian admissions if the “preference” for African-American and Hispanic applicants was
“removed”).
67
See, e.g., Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. (SFFA) v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.
(Harvard Corp.), 397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 163, 168, 171, 193–95 (D. Mass. 2019).
68
The plaintiffs’ use of terms like “bias” or “penalty,” which connote a psychological state, for
statistical facts is misleading.
69
There is a rich and extensive psychological literature demonstrating the cognitive implications of
group stratification, from the entire “implicit bias” literature evidencing that the content of stereotypes of
racial groups is psychologically present in many encounters, see, e.g., JENNIFER L. EBERHARDT, BIASED:
UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE THAT SHAPES WHAT WE SEE, THINK, AND DO (2019), to early
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distribution of the academic credentials by group has similar implications for
evaluating the statistical evidence showing that conditional statistical parity
is violated between groups in the “personal” and “overall” ratings as it was
for the probability of admission. If one group makes out a very high
proportion of the top ranking along one dimension—namely academic
ratings—and if ordinal ranking on the other rankings is done to narrow the
class of eligible candidates in order to award a scarce resource (admission),
those rankings must necessarily reflect other diversity criteria the institution
purports to value.70 That is, one would expect that some of the other metrics
used to quantify the value that “personal” dimensions would add to
Harvard’s diversity goal to be positively correlated with membership in the
groups that would be underrepresented if Harvard just relied on academic
metrics.71
One might even see the personally demeaning character of having to
value racial diversity through assignment of some amorphous thing called
“personal rating,” the upshot of the Supreme Court’s disjointed doctrine. The
Court’s affirmative action doctrine disallows universities from pursuing a
“quota or a goal”72 in racial composition, or engaging in “racial balancing,”73
but does allow for consideration of race as “but a ‘factor of a factor of a
factor’ in the holistic-review calculus.”74 As foreshadowed by the dissenting
Justices in Gratz, the Court’s prior decisions demand admissions procedures
childhood development studies showing that even minimal forms of symbolic or material differentiation
among children engenders cognitive biases towards “in-group” members. See, e.g., Harriet Over et al.,
Young Children Seek Out Biased Information about Social Groups, 21 DEV. SCI. 1, 10–11 (2018); Xin
Yang & Yarrow Dunham, Minimal but Meaningful: Probing the Limits of Randomly Assigned Social
Identities, 185 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 19, 30–32 (2019).
70
Harvard claims that, although its admissions officers “do not consider the fact of an applicant’s
race in assigning the personal rating,” their personal ratings might, “indirectly reflect the applicant’s race”
because the rating “may reflect the applicant’s life experiences associated with his or her race.” Harvard’s
Response to SFFA’S Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 23, 28, Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019) (No. 14cv-14176-ADB) (emphasis added). An implication of the constructivist account of race is that the
distinction between “race as such” (i.e., “the fact of an applicant’s race”) and “life experiences associated
with . . . race” is an untenable distinction. Id. So, if Harvard is allowed to “consider” the “diversity” added
by certain “life experiences associated with . . . race,” id., then it is not clear to me why the plaintiffs’
evidence that “race influenced the personal rating”—understood as “the fact of an applicant’s race”—is
evidence of discrimination under current doctrine. Transcript of Closing Arguments at 28, Students for
Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019)
(No. 14-cv-14176-ADB).
71
This is conceptually distinct from the argument that Harvard’s expert emphasizes, which is that
the administrative data is an imperfect quantification of an irreducible array of qualitative differences
between candidates and, therefore, the most important differences are not observable. See Harvard Expert
Report, supra note 25, at 25–27.
72
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978).
73
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
74
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207 (2016) (citations omitted).
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that necessarily suffer from the “disadvantage of deliberate obfuscation.”75
In this case, there is a dignitary distortion to applicants on the basis of race
when the only way to pursue the laudable and constitutional goal of diversity
involves devaluing other applicants on the basis of an assessment of
unnamed “personal” traits.76
This leads to a final question: Is there no way Harvard can achieve racial
diversity using race-neutral means? For the life of me, I have never
understood what a speaker could possibly mean by the designation of certain
factors as “race-neutral” in the context of exploring mechanisms that can
achieve racial diversity. If the factor is not correlated with race and there is
no social mechanism connecting race and the factor, then it will not, by
definition, serve any function whatsoever towards the goal of achieving
racial diversity.77 If the factor is correlated with race and if there is a social
mechanism that produces that correlation (as opposed to it being a random
statistical fluke), it cannot be reasonably labeled “race-neutral.” There is no
“race-neutral” means of achieving the end of racial diversity.78 To insist on
individualism, colorblindness, race neutrality, and the like in the face of a
charge of racial injustice is nonresponsive. It can mean one of two things:
either the speaker does not understand what the form of groupness called
‘race’ references in our society, or the speaker understands, and nevertheless
thinks zero weight should be given to that form of groupness in moral and
political affairs. The only way to argue about what racial equality or
nondiscrimination requires is to first inquire into how that form of social
groupness is currently constituted, and then to debate what is fair and just in
a specific domain given those facts.

75

Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
“If honesty is the best policy, surely Michigan’s accurately described, fully disclosed College
affirmative action program is preferable to achieving similar numbers through winks, nods, and
disguises.” Id. at 305 (Ginsburg & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
77
Even a mechanism that is “race blind” like a lottery would not be “race neutral” in contrast to a
different mechanism, say admission strictly on the basis of SAT, because it has the effect of changing the
racial composition relative to the contrasted mechanism.
78
Certainly, some Justices have recognized this. See, e.g., id. at 298 (Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.,
dissenting) (“The ‘percentage plans’ are just as race conscious as the point scheme (and fairly so), but
they get their racially diverse results without saying directly what they are doing or why they are doing
it.”); Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297, 335 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[O]nly an ostrich could regard the
supposedly neutral alternatives as race unconscious . . . . Texas’ percentage plan was adopted with
racially segregated neighborhoods and schools front and center stage.”).
76
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